Multipath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP) is an approach towards high-throughput and efficient load balancing over multiple paths. Each of paths forms a TCP connection with an IP address, and those can be implemented as multiple network interfaces or multiple ports within a network interface. In this paper, we focus on the multiple network interfaces environment. Each network interface with an IP address is called as a subflow. A subflow is a TCP connection which can have a different internet path identified by IP addresses of source and destination network interfaces. To control these multiple subflows, MPTCP supports many options. Specifically, to establish a new subflow, MPTCP uses an ADD_ADDR option. A host sends ADD_ADDR option to inform another host of its IP address, and then, the host receiving ADD_ADDR option tries to establish a subflow at the address of ADD_ADDR option. However, by forging the ADD_ADDR option, an attacker can create a fake subflow that passes through itself and eventually hijack the connection between both end hosts. In a previous study, Hash-based Message Authentication (HMAC) was added to the ADD_ADDR option, preventing it from being forged. Nevertheless, since the keys for generating HMAC can be leaked during three-way handshake, a variant of the ADD_ADDR attack called the persistent ADD_ADDR attack can be possible. To this end, we propose a protocol that can prevent the ADD_ADDR attacks by backward confirmation of the ADD_ADDR option without encryption. The main idea of our proposal is to apply a digital signature scheme for the backward confirmation. We show security analysis for the proposed protocol and compare with the previous studies in terms of time/space overheads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multipath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP), specified in RFC 6824 [1] , is a TCP extension for a transport connection to utilize multiple network interfaces on multi-homed hosts concurrently. In MPTCP, a MPTCP connection consists of subflows, each of which is a TCP connection which can have a different Internet path identified by IP addresses of source and destination network interfaces. To this end, if an application changes its transport layer protocol to MPTCP, concurrent transmission of data through multiple subflows can be possible with better throughput, more reliable connectivity, and little deployment cost. As multihoming-capable The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ghufran Ahmed . mobile devices such as smartphones, tables, and laptops become ubiquitous, MPTCP is used in Apple iOS and Samsung smartphones, and planned to be up-streamed in the Linux kernel [2] .
Amongst various options of MPTCP for controlling subflows, we focus on ADD_ADDR option which is known to have a vulnerability [3] . Especially in mobile environments, this ADD_ADDR option is important, because whenever IP address of a network interface in a mobile device changes over time, the device needs to inform the peer host of its changed IP address with the ADD_ADDR option without encryption. To this end, an attacker on the path can easily eavesdrop the control message, send a forged control message to the target (i.e., peer) host, and establish a fake subflow with the target host. Furthermore, if the attacker can eavesdrop some of the other subflows, it is possible to predict future sequence numbers so that a valid subflow between the mobile device and the peer host can be terminated. By repeating these attacks, the attacker can hijack the whole MPTCP connection. This is referred to as an ADD_ADDR attack.
As a naive solution for the vulnerability, a bis draft for RFC 6824 adds Hash-based Message Authentication (HMAC) [4] to the ADD_ADDR option which can detect unauthorized modification of the option. The HMAC involves a protocol-specified hash function and secret cryptographic keys which are exchanged in the MPTCP connection establishment. However, the bis draft gives no protection for the key in the MPTCP 3-way handshaking, and if one of the keys is leaked, an unauthorized host eavesdropping the key can be disguised as a valid host.
Several research efforts propose to use encryption in the key exchange process occurred at the starting phase of the MPTCP connection, but high time and space overheads cannot be avoided. Considering short-lived flows has little throughput gain for MPTCP, this encryption overhead can be a severe penalty for short-lived flows. Especially, an approach [10] try to utilize Transport Layer Security (TLS) for the key exchange, which is highly redundant for short-lived flows. On the other hand, another research effort [16] suggests to exchange keys for each subflow handshaking, but frequent handoffs may consume too much power and computation resources in highly mobile environments such as high-speed rails [5] .
To this end, we propose a novel protocol to prevent the ADD_ADDR attack with minimal overhead. By backward confirmation of the received ADD_ADDR option, we do not have to adapt encryption schemes to MPTCP. To verify security and lightweight overhead of the proposed protocol, we make a formal model of the strongest attacker model and the proposed protocol and compare with the previous studies in terms of time/space overheads.
The sections of this paper are as follows: the background information for MPTCP is provided in II, definitions of threat models in III, an explanation of the proposed protocol in IV, an overall evaluation in V, information on related works in VI, and finally the conclusion of the paper in VII.
II. OVERVIEW OF MPTCP
In this section, we describe an overview of MPTCP, focusing on the initial connection between two end hosts and additional subflow establishment using the ADD_ADDR option with an example shown in Fig. 1 .
A. MULTIPATH-TCP
MPTCP is a TCP extension enabling the simultaneous use of several paths. Multiple paths can be implemented by using different ports within a network interface or using several network interfaces. In this paper, we focus on a multi-homed host. A multi-homed host means that a host has multiple network interfaces, whereas single-homed host means that a host has only a single network interface. MPTCP makes peers to use different paths with different IP addresses. The peers with MPTCP exchange packets belonging to the MPTCP connection. It does not require any change to application, because it supports a compatibility with regular TCP. However, to the network layer, each MPTCP subflow works like a regular TCP flow. A MPTCP subflow is a flow of TCP segments operating over an individual path, which forms part of a larger MPTCP connection.
In Fig. 1 , a multi-homed Host A has two different network interfaces. Specifically, one network interface with IP address A1 can access a cellular network with 3G/LTE, and the other network interface with IP address A2 can access a computer network with Wi-Fi. When an application in Host A runs on top of regular TCP, then only one of the two network interfaces is allocated for a TCP connection to a peer Host B. It is because each TCP connection can be identified as a four-tuple (Source IP address, Source Port, Destination IP address, Destination Port).
On the other hand, when both Host A and Host B are equipped with MPTCP instead of regular TCP, the two network interfaces can be utilized for a MPTCP connection to Host B. In this example, Host A has a MPTCP connection with two subflows: Subflow 1 between A1 and B1 and Subflow 2 between A2 and B1. Note that for intermediate devices on a network path, each subflow can be seen as a plain TCP connection with TCP options (defined by the MPTCP extension) so that using MPTCP does not hurt the existing connectivity provided by TCP and achieves resource pooling [7] easily.
1) MPTCP CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT
As an extension of TCP, MPTCP tries to minimize additional overheads as well as to reuse existing TCP functions. To this end, at the beginning of the MPTCP connection establishment, the 3-way handshake, i.e., exchange of SYN, SYN/ACK, and ACK, is performed with additional MP_CAPABLE option for each message.
An example for the MPTCP's 3-way handshake is described in Fig. 2 : Host A sends SYN + MP_CAPABLE message, Host B sends SYN/ACK + MP_CAPABLE message after receiving SYN + MP_CAPABLE, and finally, Host A sends ACK + MP_CAPABLE as a response of SYN/ACK + MP_CAPABLE. In the first two messages, each host includes its own 64-bit key and additional information in the variable-length MP_CAPABLE option, and the third message sent from Host A contains both keys and additional information.
With the modified 3-way handshake, each host can confirm that this connection is capable to use MPTCP. Note that the 64-bit keys are used to authenticate additional subflow establishment.
2) ADDITIONAL SUBFLOW ESTABLISHMENT
One important feature of MPTCP is that subflows can be established additionally or terminated while MPTCP connections are maintained. With this feature, MPTCP can support mobility [6] and efficiently utilize various network paths in a dynamic manner. However, the current version of MPTCP additional subflow establishment also has a security vulnerability. Thus, we briefly describe the procedure with the above example, before describing security issues.
According to RFC 6824 [1] , there are two ways to establish an additional subflow. One is to make another 3-way TCP handshake between Host A and Host B with the MP_JOIN option, while the other is to use the ADD_ADDR option before conducting another 3-way TCP handshake. The former way is sufficient in some static scenarios, especially in case that the new handshake from Host A can be successfully done.
However, in some circumstances, the new handshake may not be successful. In Fig. 1 , for example, suppose a Network Address Translation (NAT)-enabled router is on the network path between A2 and B1, and the router prevents a new 3-way handshake initiated by Host A. Then, the former way cannot be successful. In this case, the latter way to use the ADD_ADDR option can establish an additional subflow successfully. To this end, the ADD_ADDR message is typically sent whenever an IP address of the host is changed.
The latter part of Fig. 2 describes the additional subflow establishment with ADD_ADDR option. Host A uses the ADD_ADDR option to inform Host B of its IP address A2, and later Host B initiates a new 3-way TCP handshake with the MP_JOIN option. 
III. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first discuss types of potential attackers exploiting the ADD_ADDR option based on RFC 7430 [3] . We also discuss a variant of the ADD_ADDR attack for which the bis draft of RFC 6824 [1] is not sufficient.
A. TYPES OF ATTACKERS
At first, we can classify attackers exploiting the ADD_ADDR option based on their location:
• Off-path attacker: This type refers to an attacker who is not located in any subflow throughout the entire time of MPTCP connection.
• Partial-time on-path attacker: This type of attacker refers to one who is located in at least one subflow path for a certain period of time.
• On-path attacker: This type refers to an attacker who is located in at least one subflow path for the entire time of MPTCP connection. Another approach for classifying attackers is based on their attack capability:
• Eavesdropper: This type refers to an attacker who eavesdrops on messages from MPTCP connection.
• Active attacker: This type of attacker required to one who can eavesdrop on, change, remove, and/or delay messages being transmitted on MPTCP connection. With these classification criteria (i.e., location and capability), we can consider six combinations of attackers for MPTCP. In this study, however, we consider off-path active attacker and on-path active attacker only. It is because attack vectors of the ADD_ADDR attack are constrained so that eavesdropping the ADD_ADDR option has limited information without active attack. Note that RFC 7430 [3] considers off-path active attackers only.
B. THE ADD_ADDR ATTACK
As described in Section I, the ADD_ADDR attack tries to force a target host to initiate a fake subflow through an attacker. Fig. 3 shows an example scenario for the ADD_ADDR attack by an off-path active attacker, Host C. Suppose there is a MPTCP connection between Host A with IP address A1 and Host B with IP address B1. The attacker Host C creates a fake ADD_ADDR message with its own address IP C1 and sends the message to Host B. Note that in Fig. 3 , ADD_ADDR(address = IP C1) represents that empty address field of a new ADD_ADDR message is written by the IP address of Host C1.
After Host B receives the fake message, Host B sends a SYN + MP_JOIN message to the attacker to establish a fake subflow. When the attacker obtains a valid SYN + MP_JOIN message, the attacker can enable a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack by overwriting the address field of the SYN + MP_JOIN message with its IP address C1. The overwriting can be represented by MP_JOIN(address= IP C1) in Fig. 3 . It represents that the address field of MP_JOIN is overwritten by the IP address of Host C1. One issue for an off-path active attacker to perform the ADD_ADDR attack is how to obtain sufficient information (e.g., the four-tuple to identify an existing MPTCP subflow) to create a ADD_ADDR message. RFC 7430 [3] discusses the feasibility of obtaining information for the ADD_ADDR attack. Note that on-path active attackers can perform the ADD_ADDR attack without difficulty.
As a defence, a bis draft for RFC 6824 [8] adds HMAC [4] to the ADD_ADDR option in order for Host B to authenticate the received ADD_ADDR message. The HMAC needs a protocol-specified hash function and secret cryptographic keys which are exchanged in the MPTCP connection establishment. Note that the keys are exchanged in cleartext in the 3-way handshake, according to the draft. After the keys are successfully exchanged, then an end host which has a new IP address can generate HMAC of the added address and the ADD_ADDR option with the HMAC will be sent. Then the peer host can authenticate the address using HMAC. We call this updated ADD_ADDR option with HMAC as ADD_ADDR2.
C. THE PERSISTENT ADD_ADDR ATTACK
Although the original ADD_ADDR attack only considers off-path active attacker, more powerful attackers can exist in practice. Amongst them, an on-path active attacker can eavesdrop on one or more subflows for a MPTCP connection and modify MPTCP messages for the subflows. In this case, using ADD_ADDR2 is not sufficient to protect a variant of ADD_ADDR attack called persistent ADD_ADDR attack, since the on-path active attacker can generate a valid HMAC by eavesdropping on unencrypted keys exchanged during the initial MPTCP 3-way handshake. Fig. 4 shows an example of the persistent ADD_ADDR attack by an on-path active attacker, Host C, when the ADD_ADDR2 option is used. As in the off-path case, suppose a MPTCP connection between Host A with IP address A1 and Host B with IP address B1 is already established. Furthermore, we assume that Host C already eavesdrops on a subflow between A1 and B1 from the beginning, and has a network interface with address C1. To this end, the attacker knows the exchanged HMAC keys Key A and Key B for Host A and Host B.
According to the bis draft for RFC 6824 [8] , when Host A sends an ADD_ADDR2 option containing a new IP address, Host A generates (a truncated version of) HMAC H by performing the HMAC algorithm with two inputs: the HMAC key K = Key A ||Key B and a part of the ADD_ADDR2 option as the HMAC message, where || represents the concatenation operation. Accordingly, an attacker who wants to hijack the MPTCP connection needs to generate HMAC with the same way.
Note that, in typical, the part of the ADD_ADDR2 option consists of address ID, IP address, and port fields used for creating a new subflow. For the attacker, the IP address field should be filled with one of its own IP addresses (e.g., C1), and other fields can be arbitrarily chosen. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that the HMAC message consists of the IP address for the new subflow only. That is, the resulting HMAC for the attacker with IP address C1 is H = HMAC(K , IP C1), as shown in Fig. 4 .
After H is generated, the attacker can send a fake ADD_ADDR2 message by concatenating ADD_ADDR2 and H . When ADD_ADDR2 message is arrived at Host B, Host B generates another HMAC using the information in ADD_ADDR2, and checks whether H equals H or not. If the result is true, i.e., the ADD_ADDR2 option is valid, then the same procedure will be done as in the ADD_ADDR attack. In conclusion, the ADD_ADDR2 option cannot protect the persistent ADD_ADDR attack.
IV. SECURE SUBFLOW ESTABLISHMENT
As seen in Section III-C, the ADD_ADDR2 option is not sufficient to prevent the persistent ADD_ADDR attack, if the attacker is aware of keys of both hosts, further passing the validation. Therefore, to solve the issue under the on-path active attacker model, a method that does not rely on two keys is necessary. 
A. BACKWARD ADDRESS CONFIRMATION
Our idea to avoid the key leakage issue is backward address confirmation that when a host receives the ADD_ADDR2 option, the host sends the received ADD_ADDR2 option to the peer host to ask for confirmation of the ADD_ADDR2 option transmission. Fig. 5 shows an example of the persistent ADD_ADDR attack with the proposed protocol. We assume that Host C knows the two keys of the hosts, Key A and Key B , for example, by eavesdropping the initial handshake. In this case, Host C is able to generate a valid HMAC and sends the ADD_ADDR2 option with the HMAC to Host B. Host B does not validate the received ADD_ADDR2 option and sends the received option with flag set to the connected Host A through the connection IP A1. If the received address matches the one that the ADD_ADDR2 option contains, Host A sends a signed ACK message to Host B. Otherwise, in case that the two addresses do not match, Host A will send a Warning message instead.
If Host B receives a signed ACK message from Host A, Host B will either send a SYN + MP_JOIN after verifying the signed ACK message or ignore the forged ACK option. When the signed ACK message is valid, Host B regards the ACK message as a message from Host A. This procedure will prevent Host C, who knows Key A and Key B by eavesdropping the initial handshake, from disguising as a valid host.
On the other hand, if an ADD_ADDR2 message is sent from Host A to Host B and its corresponding reconfirmation ADD_ADDR2 message is intercepted by the attacker, the hosts cannot establish an additional subflow. Nevertheless, the attacker also cannot make a fake subflow, because the attacker cannot generate any valid messages, i.e., ACK and
Warning messages. For validity, the messages must be signed by private key from a valid host, which is discussed in the Section IV-B Thus, the proposed protocol does not worry about intercepting the reconfirmation message. Note that even if the hosts of the proposed protocol cannot establish an additional subflow, the hosts still communicate through the existing subflows.
B. DIGITAL SIGNATURE FOR A FURTHER ATTACK
In the previous discussion, we assume that a private key is used by Host A to generate valid messages. Actually, the proposed protocol adapts a digital signature scheme to prevent further attacks of Host C forging the ACK and Warning messages from Host A. For example, when Host A sends a ACK (or Warning) message to Host B, Host C is able to forge the message again. To prevent such attack, the message must be signed by the sender. The basic idea of public key signature schemes is that the private key is to be used for signing and the public key is used for verifying the signed message, unlike the public key encryption schemes. The public key encryption schemes work in a way that the public key is used for encrypting messages while private key is used for decrypting the encrypted messages.
To forge the signed messages, Host C must guess the private key of Host A, which is extremely difficult. If the length of an ideally-generated private key is n bits, the attacker has to infer the private key with a (1/2) n probability. Thus, as long as the length of the private key is long enough, the signature is secure. In this proposed protocol, we suppose that the length of the key is 64 bits. This also indicates that the proposed protocol has a level of the security of (1/2) 64 . While one attacker may conduct 2 64 trials for brute force attack, we can detect the attack and change the private key. In Section V-B, we prove the security of the proposed protocol by showing the success probability of the persistent ADD_ADDR attack when the on-path active attacker is negligible.
It seems that the proposed protocol only prevent the persistent ADD_ADDR attack by sacrificing prevention of eavesdropping hosts' keys for HMAC. However, the proposed protocol does not sacrifice protection of the key leakage. The proposed protocol adopts the digital signature scheme. The digital signature scheme allows a signer to sign a message using a private key and a verifier to verify a message using a shared public key. It provides authentication and integrity of messages like HMAC. In addition, it prevents the key leakage. Only the public key is exchanged in the handshake process. To forge the message, an adversary must know the private key. However, the adversary cannot know the private key by eavesdropping the handshake process. Thus, the propose protocol prevents not only the persistent ADD_ADDR attack but also the key leakage.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposal and other studies designed to defend against the persistent ADD_ADDR attack. We also conduct a security analysis for our proposal.
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss evaluation results under a normal scenario in which the ADD_ADDR2 option is exchanged without the attacker.
We discuss the total delay until an additional subflow is established as a performance metric. For convenience of our discussion, even though different path between two end hosts may have different one-way delay, we assume that each path between any two hosts has the same one-way delay. To this end, the total delay is computed by counting the number of one-way delays. For convenience, we will call one-way delay as 'delay'.
At first, we discuss the number of delays until an additional subflow is established using the insecure ADD_ADDR2 option of MPTCP [8] which is described in Fig. 2 . After Host A and Host B conduct three-way handshaking with the MP_CAPABLE option, Host A starts an additional subflow establishment procedure by sending the ADD_ADDR2 option which takes 1 delay. Then Host A and Host B conduct another three-way handshaking with MP_JOIN option. On the other hand, our proposal requires exchange of additional messages, as described in Fig. 6 . After the first three-way handshaking, the signed ADD_ADDR2 message and the corresponding reconfirmation message is exchanged. When the reconfirmation message arrives at Host A, ACK message is sent to Host B, which triggers another three-way handshaking with MP_JOIN option. In summary, the proposed protocol requires an additional 2 delays to establish an additional subflow compared to MPTCP [8] .
Furthermore, we conduct comparison of the proposed protocol and the existing MPTCP studies which is summarized in Table 1 . In the table, the key exchange overhead (in bytes) and the number of delays for each option and each scheme are described.
For the MP_CAPABLE option, since the proposed protocol has the same initial three-way handshaking, it has the same performance as MPTCP [8] . On the other hand, SMPTCP [11] , MPTLS [10] , and hash chain [15] require a minimum size of 52 bytes for key exchange in the MP_CAPABLE option, which is larger than our proposal. In addition, the proposal has the minimum number of delays for the MP_CAPABLE option.
In establishing a subflow under encrypted the ADD_ADDR2 option, the proposed protocol only needs 30 bytes, at least 2 bytes less than the existing studies, and one more delay for it, because SMPTCP and MPTLS share the key using asymmetric key exchange method, and conduct block-encryption using the shared key. The asymmetric key exchange method and encrypted messages increase the size of packets according to the size of public information, such as public keys. In addition, MPTLS performs TLS handshake after a subflow of MPTCP is established: so not only is the greatest packet size required, but also the longest time overhead.
In the situation that MPTCP hosts repeat the ADD_ADDR2 such as mobile environment, the proposed protocol has better performance than other studies. If the situation occurs n times, the overhead of the proposed protocol is calculated as 30n. On the other hand, the overhead of SMPTCP and MPTLS is calculated as 32n. Thus, the proposed protocol has superiority under the situation.
B. SECURITY EVALUATION
In this section, we first define functions used for the exchange of ADD_ADDR2 options, and then the attacker model is defined in a formal method [9] . Based on the definitions, we will discuss our security evaluation result.
C. FUNCTIONS TO MODEL THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
To model the secure subflow establishment procedure of the proposed protocol, we define a set of functions as follows. At first, Definition 1 is a set of functions which show how the ADD_ADDR2 option is exchanged.
Definition 1 (Functions for the ADD_ADDR2 Message): The proposed protocol defines a set of functions to exchange messages with the ADD_ADDR2 option as follows:
• Gen(A ID , A IP , Pt, H ): This function generates a message with the ADD_ADDR2 option, given A ID defining the connection between two hosts as the only identifier, A IP representing the address the host wishes to connect to, Pt representing the port number, and H representing the HMAC.
• Send B A (m): This function is for Host A to send a message m to Host B.
• Rcv A (m): This function is for Host A to receive a message m. We denote the set of all possible messages with the ADD_ADDR2 option generated by Gen(·) as
where the arguments A ID , A IP , Pt, and H are given.
Next, Definition 2 is a set of security-related functions for validating and signing messages. Note that these functions are already appeared in Fig. 5 , although a variant of Flagset A (·) is defined and used in Section III-A instead of Flagset A (·).
Definition 2 (Security-Related Functions): Suppose a security parameter n is given, where n is the number of bits of a private key. The proposed protocol defines a set of functions to sign and validate a message m ∈ Q with the ADD_ADDR2 option as follows:
• Flagset A (m, F, f ): This function is for Host A to set the value of a flag F in message m as f .
• Check A (m, F, f ) ∈ {0, 1}: This function is for Host A to check whether a flag F of message m has the value of f or not. If the value of F equals f , the function returns 1; otherwise 0.
• (pk, sk) := KGen(n): This function generates a n-bit public key and private key pair (pk, sk).
• σ := Sign sk (m): This function generates a signature σ for message m with a private key sk.
• Verify pk (m, σ ) ∈ {0, 1}: This function is to verify message m with a signature σ by using a public key pk. If the message is valid, the function returns 1; otherwise 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ACK message is a variant of message m generated by Gen(·) and modified by Flagset A (m, ACK _ADD_ADDR2, 1). Also, we denote the procedure for exchanging the ADD_ADDR2 option in the existing MPTCP [8] as = (Gen, Send, Rcv) , and the procedure for exchanging the ADD_ADDR2 option in the proposed protocol as¯ = (Gen, Send, Rcv, Flagset, Check, Sign, Verify).
Definition 3 gives a set of required functions to model an attacker performing the persistent ADD_ADDR attack.
Definition 3 (Adversary Model):
We consider an adversary model for performing the persistent ADD_ADDR attack in Section III by defining an oracle function which returns an information vector where an on-path attacker is able to obtain each element from eavesdropping.
(A ID , A IP , Pt, H , pk) := Oracle() Note that the information vector specifies all the elements which can be obtained from eavesdropping and used for generate a fake ADD_ADDR2 message. With the definitions, we can specify the persistent ADD_ADDR attack imitating an additional subflow establishment procedure . The persistent ADD_ADDR attack experiment AD_Atk A, (n) is as follows:
1) Uses KGen(n) to create a public-private key pair (pk, sk) for signing, where sk is not available for Adversary A. 2) Adversary A queries an information vector to the MPTCP oracle using Oracle(). 3) Whenever a valid ADD_ADDR2 message m should be generated, Adversary A generates the message m = Gen(A ID , A IP , Pt, H ) using the queried information vector (A ID , A IP , Pt, H ). 4) Whenever a flag F of a message m should have value f , Adversary A performs Flagset A (m, F, f ). 5) Whenever a signature σ for message m should be generated, Adversary A generates a secret key sk from the queried information vector and then generates σ = Sign sk (m). 6) The result of the experiment equals Verify pk (m, σ ).
1) SECURITY ANALYSIS
The following theorem using the functions defined in section V-C states the proposed protocol is secure for the persistent ADD_ADDR attack. We consider a negligible function negl(n) for the security parameter n. Note that a function f is negligible if for every positive integer c there exists an integer N c such that for all integers n > N c , f (n) < 1/n c holds.
Theorem 1 (Privacy Against AD_Atk A, (n)): Let is exploited by the persistent ADD_ADDR attack AD_Atk A, (n). If the persistent ADD_ADDR attack AD_Atk A,¯ (n) is conducted by a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary and¯ contains a procedure Verify pk (m, σ ) to verify a message m with attached signature σ and known public key pk, then¯ is secure under the persistent ADD_ADDR attack.
Proof: Proof of proposition 1 is trivial, since every step of the procedure can be imitable by AD_Atk A, (n). So let's prove proposition 2. Suppose A is probabilistic polynomial-time adversary following the persistent ADD_ADDR attack AD_Atk A,¯ (n), and Q is a set of all possible ADD_ADDR2 messages configured by the adversary A with Oracle(). When¯ contains a procedure Verify pk (m, σ ) to verify a message m with attached signature σ , the adversary A tries to guess a secret key sk from the queried information vector (A ID , A IP , Pt, H , pk). However, since sk and (A ID , A IP , Pt, H ) has no dependency and the public-key encryption requires KGen(n) to generate independent a sk and pk pair, the adversary A has no effective information about the private key sk. Therefore, the probability of satisfying AD_Atk A,¯ (n) = 1 is 1 2 n according to the probabilistic polynomial-time adversary assumption, and Pr[AD_Atk A,¯ (n) = 1] ≤ negl(n).
VI. RELATED WORK
This section introduces related studies. In Section VI-A, we describe the studies that try to solve a certain problem by applying encryption schemes to the transport layer while Section VI-B consists of the studies that do not rely on encryption schemes.
A. ENCRYPTION-BASED SCHEMES
MPTLS [10] resolves the persistent ADD_ADDR attack by hosts exchanging keys to create HMAC using TLS. However, MPTLS requires TLS handshaking before key exchanging, which causes additional overhead. SMPTCP [11] utilizes asymmetric keys. It uses Tcpcrypt [17] to establish a secure MPTCP connection by allowing both hosts to determine the cryptographic protocol in order to protect TCP payload. Note that Tcpcrypt is compatible with MPTCP, because it just includes a TCP option without any modifications for each subflow. Therefore, SMPTCP is better than MPTLS in the number of delays.
MPTCPsec [13] is a protocol that integrates encryption and authentication in MPTCP. This applies TCP-ENO option [14] for providing encryption. MPTCPsec has two advantages regarding TLS and SSL. First, when it senses the forged packet, it does not close the whole connection of MPTCP but instead simply closes the forged path, and thus provides the continuity of data transmission. Second, MPTCPsec is able to protect data and authenticate subflow establishment. However, it also shows dramatically reduced throughput due to the cost of unoptimized encryption and authentication.
B. NON-ENCRYPTION-BASED SCHEMES
The hash chain-based solution [15] recursively creates a list of consecutive hash values generated by a hash function. The host repeats the hash function with the initial random value until it has a pre-defined n-length hash chain. While the handshake in MPTCP connection is initiated, the hosts exchange the last hash value and when the subflow establishment is started, each host transfers the previous hash value to the following value. However, the on-path active attacker can intercept the SYN/ACK + MP_JOIN and create a new subflow based on the hash obtained from the SYN packet, even if the attacker has no knowledge of the hash chain.
Munir et al. [16] presented a study to defend an attack using the two cross-path MPTCP vulnerability. It uses a method of dividing secret information to solve the vulnerability. Each host creates HMAC by creating random nonce and exchanging them for each subflow handshake, rather than the host key for the initial handshake. This would prevent the attacker, who can control any subflow, from forging the MPTCP option in other subflows. However, in the attack model proposed in this paper, it is not possible to defend the persistent ADD_ADDR attack by sharing secret information due to the fact that the attacker is fully aware of all information exchanged via subflows.
The schemes adapting asymmetric key for encryption conduct secure initial handshake processes, because there must be no leakage of keys for both hosts. However, it needs additional time and packet space for secure key exchange process. Hash-chain key exchange scheme does not only have enormous time and space overhead, but also, its prevention is not secure against the persistent ADD_ADDR attack of the on-path active attacker. It simply forms authentication messages by comparing the hash list inversely. This shows not much difference from exchanging keys in non-encrypted environment. The scheme of [16] exchanges additional secret information, nonce, for every subflow establishment, and generates HMAC with keys of hosts and nonces. It is only secure against attack models occupying a subflow, because the attacker located in several, or all subflows is capable of obtaining multiple exchanged nonces.
In Table 2 , SMPTCP and MPTLS are secure against the persistent ADD_ADDR attack under off-path active attacker and on-path active attacker, because both of them prevent the key leakage by encrypting the handshake process. [16] is secure under off-path active attacker who cannot know all of secret information. However, since on-path active attacker knows all of secret information, the attacker in [16] can conduct the persistent ADD_ADDR attack. Hash chain and regular MPTCP are not secure under both attacker model, because both of them are not protected by encryption. On the other hand, SMPTCP and MPTLS are secure under the persistent ADD_ADDR attack, however, they cause a lot of time and space overhead as shown in Table 1 .
VII. CONCLUSION
Secure subflow establishment is one of the most important issues in MPTCP. However, a subflow establishment option called ADD_ADDR option has a vulnerability so that an attacker can establish a fake subflow. Furthermore, an enhancement for the ADD_ADDR option is not sufficient to resolve a variant of the ADD_ADDR attack, called the persistent ADD_ADDR attack. To this end, we proposed a protocol to prevent the ADD_ADDR attacks. Our idea is to utilize a digital signature scheme to check whether the ADD_ADDR option is forged or not. We compared our proposal with other research efforts in time/space overheads and security under an on-path active attacker model. For future work, we plan to improve the proposed protocol to resist Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that is an attempt to temporarily or indefinitely suspend the service of a host from using network resources.
